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NERVOUS LAUGHTER AND THE HIGH COST OF
EQUALITY:
RENEWING "NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND" WILL
SAFEGUARD A VIBRANT FEDERALISM AND A PATH
TOWARD EDUCATIONAL EXCELLENCE
I. INTRODUCTION
Presidential candidates called it "unconstitutional," an
"unfunded mandate."' Its fiercest critics charge its intent is to
undermine and dismantle public education itself. 2 National
Public Radio betrayed a grievous misunderstanding when it
erroneously described a thoughtful proposal in Congress to
provide tax credits to non-participating states as a radical

1. Tom Tancredo called No Child Left Be hind "intrusive" and "uncon stitutional."
Election '08: Talk with the Candidates, WASH. PosT, Oct. 11, 2007, available at
http://www. washingtonpost .com/wpdyn/content/discussion/2007/10/0l/DI2007100101446.html. Bill Richardson and Hillary
Clinton both called the la w an "unfunded manda te." Transcript, Hillary Clinton's
N.Y.
TIMES,
Jan.
3,
2008,
available
at
Caucus
Speech,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/03/us/politics/03clinton-transcript.html?
pagewanted=print ("And if you are worried about once and for all taking on global
warming, making it clear that we will end the unfunded mandate known as No Child
Left Behind, t hat we will make college affordable again, that we will be once a gain the
country of values and ideals that we cherish so much , then, please, join me in this
campaign.") ; Bill Richardson, Op-Ed., N CLB Fails Our Schools, USA TO DAY, Sep. 7,
2007, at lOA ("We need to move beyond the empty rhetoric of No Child Left Behind ....
True education r eform requires more than a set of unfund ed m andates and a list of
failing schools. It requires a vision for success [and] the state and federal funding to
match .... ") . On the term "unfunded mandate," see infra. note 122 and accompanying
text.
2. See Gerald W. Bracey, Believing the Worst , STAN. MAG., July-Aug. 2006,
available at http://www.stanfordalumni.org/news/magazine/2006/j ulaug/features/nclb.
html ("NCLB aims to shrink the public sector, transfer large sums of public money to
t he priva te sector, weaken or destroy two Democratic power bases-the teachers
unions- and provide vouchers to Jet students attend private schools at public
expense."); Al fie Kohn , NCLB and the Effort To Privatize Public Education, in MANY
CHILDREN LEFT BEHIND: HOW THE No CH ILD L EFT BEHIND ACT IS DAMAGING OUR
CHILDREN AND OUR SCHOOLS 79, 96 (Deborah Meier & George Wood eds., 2004)
(arguing that NCLB, by both design and effect, puts the United States "at risk of
a bandoning public education altogether").
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proposal to allow states not to participate. 3 Yet the No Child
Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB) is hardly the subversive, farreaching, and peremptory law that these misconceptions and
attacks suggest. 4 Rather, NCLB is divisive because it has
raised penetrating questions with profound implications for the
future . NCLB is a major example of a federal initiative to
respond to a well documented nationwide need, and its success
or failure will influence future solutions to stubborn national
problems ranging from health care to oversight of the financial
industries. As Congress considers the renewal of NCLB, it has
a moral and political imperative to get it right.
The greatest support for NCLB continues to come from
states, communities, organizations, and families who are
sensitive to its central mission: improving the academic
achievement and educational opportunities in the poorestperforming schools to match more closely those in highperforming schools. 5 When it was enacted, NCLB enjoyed
3. Compare Claudio Sanchez, 'No Child' Law Picked Apart as Renewal Fight
Looms, MORNING EDITION, Jan. 30, 2008, available at http://www.npr.org/templates/
story/story.php?storyld=18432881 ("[Representative Scott Garrett of New Jers ey]
wants to give states the right to opt out of the law. It's an idea that several governors
support, but Congress is unlikely to seriously consider."), with Press Release, Scott
Garrett, Garrett Promotes Overhaul of Education Policy as No Child Left Behind Hits
6
Year
Anniversary
(Jan.
7,
2008),
available
at
http://garrett.house .gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?
DocumentiD=81394 ("My bill allows residents of the states that opt out of NCLB to
receive a tax credit equal to the amount that they would have otherwise received in
federal funding. So schools won't be penalized with a loss of funding if they choose to
exercise control over their own education destiny.").
4. Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 63017941).
5. Stephen L. Carter credits NCLB for narrowing the racial gap in test scores.
See Op-Ed. , Affirmative Distraction, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2008 (Week in Revi ew), at 10.
The Connecticut State Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored P eople (NAACP) intervened in Connecticut v. Spellings to defend NCLB. 549 F.
Supp. 2d 161, 163 (D. Conn. 2008) (misidentifying NAACP as a plaintiff-intervenor
rather than defendant-intervenor); Mem. of Law in Supp. of Second Mot. to Intervene
on Behalf of NAACP at 1 (No.
3:05CV1330), 2006 WL 4738705.
Coalitions of civil rights organizations and parents have sued (unsuccessfully) to
enforce NCLB's provisions, including those requiring notification to parents that their
children attend deficient schools and are eligible for supplemental ed ucational services
(free tutoring), Newark Parents Ass'n v. N ewark Pub . Sch., 547 F.3d 199 (3d Cir. 2008);
those requiring highly qualified teachers in every classroom, Renee v. Spellings, No.
C 07-4299 (N.D. Cal. June 17, 2008), 2008 WL 2468481; and those granting students in
failing schools the right to transfer to another school in the district, Ass'n of Cmty.
Orgs. for Reform Now v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 269 F. Supp. 2d 338 (S.D.N.Y.
2003).
For an example of educators' discussion of positive results from NCLB, see Betsy
Hammond, No Child Left Behind Changes Oregon Education, PORTLAND OREGONIAN,
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broad bipartisan support and recognition of its central, civil
rights objectives. 6 Much of the public has grown disenchanted,
however-"educators, legislators, and even entire states are in
open revolt over NCLB" 7-and liberal education scholars talk
of "laudable goals" and "noble agenda" overrun by inherent
flaws and "unintended consequences." 8
Where a sound and laudable premise meets flawed design
and
unintended consequences, however,
revolt and
abandonment are not the normal nor the best response. The
countless parodies and puns the name No Child Left Behind
has inspired in the press and elsewhere suggest something
more than a logical reaction is going on. 9 The protests against
NCLB are suffused with nervous laughter, which signals
unacknowledged interests and responsibilities. Granted, NCLB
has serious structural weaknesses and presents considerableperhaps unduly burdensome-political and financial challenges
for the states; but its central mission and virtues remain
unchanged.
There are two elemental objections to NCLB. Although they
are inextricably related, the first objection expresses a policy
Aug. 31, 2008, at Al.
6. See Linda Darling-Hammond, From "Separate but Equal" to "No Child Left
Behind'~· The Collision of New Standards and Old Inequalities, in MANY CHILDREN
LEFT BEHIND, supra note 2, at 3, 3; George Wood, Introduction to MANY CHILDREN
LEFT
BEHIND,
supra
note
2,
at
vii,
viii-ix.
For fuller accou nts of the complex motives behind NCLB, see PATRICK J . MCGUINN, No
CH ILD LEFT BEHIND AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF FEDERAL EDUCATION POLICY, 19652005 165-94 (2006); Andrew Rudalevige, No Child Left Behind: Forging a
Congressional Compromise, in NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND?: THE POLITICS AND PRACTICE
OF SCHOOL ACCOUNTABILITY 23 (Paul E. Peterson & Martin R. West eds., 2003).
7. Wood, supra note 6, at x. Most r ecently, the Virginia legislature voted nearly
unanimously to study the feasibility of opting out of NCLB. See Jeff Mellott, Bills To
Pull Virginia Out of No Child Left Behind Move Through Committees, DAILY NEWSREG. (Harrisonburg, Va.), Feb. 4, 2008, available at http://www.dnron line.com/details.
php'?AID=1478l&CHID=2; Jeff Mellott, NCLB Contingency Bill Passes House, DAILY
NEWS-RF.C . (Harrisonburg, Va.), Feb. 5, 2008, available at http://www.dnronline.com/
news_details. php?AID=14793&CHID=2; Editorial, Virginia Left Behind, WASH. POST,
Mar.
6,
2008,
at
A20.
A 2008 Phi Delta Kappan/Gallup poll helps to keep the disenchantment with NCLB in
perspective, however. The poll reported that 25 percent of Americans believed NCLB
should be allowed to expire and 42 percent believed it should be changed significantly.
William J. Bushaw & Alec M. Gallup, Americans Speak Out~Are Educators and Policy
Makers Listening?, PHI DELTA KAPPAN, Sept. 2008, at 9-10, available at http://www.
pdkmembers.org/members_online/publications/e-gallup/kpoll_pdfs/pdkpoll40_2008.pdf.
8. Wood, supra note 6, at xi; Darling-Hammond, supra note 6, at 3, 4.
9. Darling-Hammond, supra note 6, at 4 ("The proliferating nicknames emerging
as this intrusive legislation plays out across the country give a sense of some of the
anger, bewilderment, and confusion left in its wake.").
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concern about education (what government should provide and
require), while the second expresses a constitutional concern
about federalism (how state and federal governments should
function and within what limits of control). The two arguments
can be summarized as follows:
1. Complying with NCLB cripples states and schools with a
sterile education policy obsessively focused on annual student
testing and other superficial, shortsighted goals. 10

2. While NCLB is in form a federal spending program,
participation in the program is optional for states in theory
only-the threat of withholding federal education funds from
states that have long relied on them unconstitutionally
coerces their participation in NCLB. Furthermore, because
the federal funding is inadequate for full compliance with
NCLB's requirements, the law unconstitutionally directs
states' education policy. 11

Both arguments sensibly address practical realities, and
Congress should learn many essential points from them as it
considers NCLB's future-especially as to the rigidity of
NCLB's deadlines and benchmarks, the punitive nature of

10. See, e.g., Darling-Hammond, supra note 6, at 9 ("The biggest problem with th e
NCLB Act is that it mistakes meas uring schools for fixing them."); Frederick M. Hess ,
Refining or Retreating?: High-Stakes Accountability in the States, in No CHILD LE FT
BEHIND?, supra note 6, at 55, 72 ("A tendency exists to recoil from the real costs of
high-stakes accountability, thus producing a series of well-intentioned compromises
that leave the fa9ade of accountability intact but strip its motive power."); Diane
Ravitch, Op-Ed., Get Congress Out of the Classroom , N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2007, a t A25
(NCLB "has unleashed an unhealthy obsession with standardized testing"; its threat of
sanctions provides "an incentive to show that schools and students are making steady
progress, even if they are not"; and its goal of universal proficiency by the year 2014 "is
simply unattainable"); see also Thomas Sobol, Discussion of NCLB's conceptual flaws in
a speech at Columbia University, Nov. 5, 2003, quoted in Charles R. Lawrence III , Who
Is the Child Left Behind?: The Racial Meaning of the New School Reform, 39 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 699 (2006) ("Educating children is like nurturing a garden; things need to be
tended steadily and slowly, and it doesn't h elp to pull them up by the roots and
measure them too often.").
11. See, e.g. , L. Darnell Weeden, Does the No Child Left Behi nd Law (NCLBA)
Burden the States as an Unfunded Mandate Under Federal Law?, 31 T. MARSHALL L.
REV. 239 (2006); Gina Austin, Note, Leaving Ji'ederalism Behind: How the No Child Left
Behind Act Uwrps States' Rights, 27 T. JEFFERSON 1. REV. 337 (2005); Michael D.
Barolsky, Note, High Schools Are Not Highways: How Dole Frees States from the
Unconstitutional Coercion of No Child Left Behind, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 725 (2008);
Coulter M. Bump, Comment, Reviving the Coercion Test: A Proposal To Prevent Federal
Conditional Spending that Leaves Children Behind, 76 U. COLO. L. RF:V. 521 (2005);
but see generally Regina R. Umpstead, The No Child Left Behind Act: Is It an
Unfunded Mandate or a Promotion of Federal Educational ideals ?, 37 ,J.L. & ED UC. 193
(2008).
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some of its sanctions, and its n eglect of teaching methods. 12
Nonetheless, these arguments tend toward a negative and
counterproductive logic that limits their u sefulness. They draw
attention to what is missing (time, money, and creative and
flexible teaching), but avoid frankly weighing the states' role in
presiding over the accretion of unmet need. They present a
contradiction by decrying excessive federal interference and
insufficient federal funding. They do not point the way forward
to correcting the long intractable problem of inequality in
educational opportunities, but insist that the flexibility and
freedom schools have enjoyed for decades is still the solution. 13
The policy argument correctly maintains that the testing
and data collection NCLB requires cannot effect meaningful
reform without a concentrated focus on teaching and
curriculum. But the implication that NCLB prevents true
teaching r eform is a straw man , however grounded it may be in
current fiscal realities . Contrarily, the policy argument more
often than not incorrectly implies that meaningful education
reform can proceed without a basic system of rigorous testing
and solid data collection in place. 14 It also obscures the primary
objective of equality behind NCLB's requirement that each
state adopt uniform educational standards. A thorough system
of assessment and accountability is the necessary basis alike of
any sound education policy and of any equality measure.
If NCLB is to succeed on its own terms, Congress will
indeed have to partner with the states to support their
development of programs for teaching and curriculum reform .
By their nature, these programs require individualization and
resist st andardization. In the meantime, though, there is no
12 . NCLB's much di scu ssed punitive sanctions ar e described with more
eq ua nimity by P rofessor Wood when he says that the focus on achievement measures
"h a [s] lead to a quanti t ative stan dar d of t h e success or failure of school distr icts. " R.
CRAIG WOOD. ED UCATIONAL FINANCE LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO STATE
AID
PLANS- AN
ANALYS IS
OF
STRATEGIES
77
(3d
ed .
2007) .
Perh a ps a n eve n mor e important consideration obscured by crit icism is t h at th e
sa ncti ons on schools a re, from anot h er perspective, remedies gua ranteed t o students.
13. For exampl e, Pr ofe ssor Ravitch , supra note 10, argues that states and school
di stricts, not Congr ess, h ave the "competence" "to fi x the nation's schools." I n t he same
context, Debor a h Meier a rgues th a t "[t]he solu t ion to t he messiness of democracy is
more of it-and mor e t ime set aside to make it work." NCLB and Democracy, in MANY
CHILDREN L EFT BEHIN D, sup r a note 2, at 66, 72 . While the concept of institut ion al
competence may ha ve some releva nce, these ar guments a re essentially argumen ts to
m ain tain th e status quo.
14 . In fa ct, it is argued t h at testing is posit ive ly detrimental t o learning. See infra
n ote 70.
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convincing justification for denying the primacy of assessment
and accountability. Those denials are, at worst, part of a
uniquely American distaste for governmental discipline that
has left us with financial, health care, energy and other
industries profoundly neglectful of sustainability.
NCLB's requirement of uniform standards across each state
is a direct attack on the inequality inherent in our system of
school financing from local property taxes . From the
perspective of the Fourteenth Amendment and the perspective
of anti-poverty measures, equalizing opportunities should take
precedence over individual communities' pursuit of excellence.
Connecticut's efforts to escape some of NCLB's requirements
provide an especially instructive example of this problem.
Connecticut lobbied and sued the Department of Education
(DOE) (the agency charged with administering NCLB) for
waivers to avoid supplementing its pre-NCLB tests that were
nationally recognized for their excellence, even while
Connecticut was recognized as the state with the single biggest
discrepancy in academic achievement between its high and low
performing students. 15 Connecticut is the only state that has
lodged a full constitutional attack on NCLB in court.
Congress should r emain committed to uniform standards
across each state, but the Bush administration's refusal to
engage in any substantive negotiation with states requesting
waivers of certain provisions of NCLB sent a chilling message
that was counterproductive to NCLB's goals. 16 In renewing
NCLB, therefore, Congress should pay particular attention to
the DOE's discretionary powers in administering the program.
The federalism argument summarized above also has merit,
especially in its perception that opting out of NCLB would
amount to a politically disastrous forfeit of federal aid that
could not be recaptured through other means, such as raising
state taxes. There may ultimately be no satisfying answer for
this problem-it may simply be a fiscal reality of the modern
federal relationship and a function of the federal government's
15. For discussion, see Michael J. Pendell, How Far Is Too Far ?: The Spending
Clause, the Tenth Amendment, and the Education State's Battle Against Unfunded
Mandates, 71 ALB. L. REV. 519, 521-23 (2008).
16. See Second Am . Compl. , at n 104- 06, 114, 117-26, 133- 36, 14.'3-59,
Connecticut v. Spellings, 549 F . Supp. 2d 161 (D. Conn. 2008) (No. 3: 05CV1 330), 2005
WL 4748348 [hereinafter Connecticut Complaint]; but see Rudalevige, supra note 6, at
46 (discussing a few areas r ela ted to test design and highly qu alified teachers in which
the Bush administration allowed st ates fl exibility in implementing NCLB).
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responsibility for equality measures under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 17
Yet, the federalism argument obscures a fact of
fundamental importance: NCLB does not determine a
participating state's education standards; it merely requires
the state to adopt standards of its choosing that are adequate
and to document the uniform application of those standards. 18
If the states' ability to opt out of NCLB is largely
impractical and simply a formalism, the federalism argument
is as much a rhetorical stance that puts Congress on the
defensive as it is a demonstration of NCLB's coercive effects. It
is telling that no state has opted out of NCLB since its
inception seven years ago. 19 Connecticut's constitutional
challenge to NCLB was dismissed as premature, since the DOE
had taken no enforcement actions or final decisions against
Connecticut. 20 Since it has not withdrawn from NCLB or
17. "No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws," U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; "The Congress shall have power
to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article," id. § 5.
The Fourteenth Amendment was the inspiration, rather than the constitutional basis,
for the civil rights legislation of the 1960s from which NCLB descends. See infra Part
II .A.
18. The possibility of promoting national standards and assessments was rejected
during the years of discussion and drafting leading up to NCLB. See MCGUINN, supra
note 6, at 130-34. Professor Ravitch, supra note 10, suggests that national testing
would remove the incentive states have to manipulate their collection of data, but this
solution will be even less palatable to NCLB's detractors who are concerned with
states'
autonomy.
Commentators frequently foster the misperception that NCLB imposes national
sta ndards through careless argumentation and/or sentence structure, as in the
following example: "NCLB now determines what constitutes a failing school and what
should be done about it." Kenneth Wong & Gail Sunderman, Education Accountability
as a Presidential Priority: No Child Left Behind and the Bush Presidency, 37 PUBLIUS
333, 334 (2007). Later in the article, the same writers distinguish more accurately
between "[t]he emergence of federally led accountability policy'' and the "decisionmaking process" of state education agencies and local school districts that under NCLB
"implement(s] the law's provisions" and "shap[es] their education reform agendas." Id.
at 341.
19. At least three school districts in Connecticut, Illinois, and Vermont refused
funding, although "none had much money at stake." Amanda Ripley, Inside the Revolt
over Bush's School Rules: The Reddest of All States Is Leading the Charge Against No
Child Left Behind, TIME MAG., May 9, 2005, at 30; see also Ulrich Boser, A New Law Is
Put to the Test , U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 22, 2004 (reporting that Somers School
District in Connecticut refused "some $45,000 in No Child Left Behind money," "only a
small
fra ction
of
the
[district's]
$15
million
annual
budget").
At least one state has lost Title I funding as a penalty under NCLB: Georgia lost
$783,000 in 2003 for delaying implementation of tests required by IASA. Rudalevige,
supra note 6, at 46. On IASA, see infra note 42 and accompanying text).
20. Conn. v. Spellings (Connecticut I), 453 F. Supp. 2d 459, 491-94 (D. Conn.
2006).
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refused to comply with any of its provisions, it may be said that
Connecticut has not put its money where its mouth was. The
other constitutional challenge to NCLB, School District of

Pontiac v. Secretary of the United States Department of
Education, was not joined or supported by any of the states in
which the plaintiff school districts reside; furthermore, Pontiac
principally alleges lack of notice rather than the fatal
constitutional defect of coercion. 21
Part II of this comment introduces the background of
federal education policy and considers NCLB's requirements
and costs in light of the states' constitutional prerogative under
the Tenth Amendment to control education. Part III sets forth
in detail the constitutional basis for federal education law in
the Spending Clause and considers whether the unfunded
spending NCLB requires of states is within the scope of
Congress's power.
II. NCLB AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS CHALLENGE IN EDUCATION

A. The Federal Role in Education

1. History
The United States Constitution makes no provisiOn for
education. Since the Tenth Amendment reserves all
unenumerated powers for state government, the federal
government has no direct control over education. 22 Early on,
the federal government provided a small amount of funding for
school construction, vocational and higher education, and some
specialized programs like school lunch and impact aid; in 1958,
it first provided some funding for academic instruction in

21. See 512 F.3d 252 (6th Cir. 2008), vacated and reh'g en bane granted, 2008 U.S.
App. LEXIS 12121 (May 1, 2008) (No. 05-2708). The case was reargued before the Sixth
Circuit en bane on December 10, 2008. Editorial, No Money, No Child: We Can't Afford
Education Reform on the Cheap, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 15, 2008, at B6; Mark
Walsh, Full 6th Circuit Weighs NEA Suit Against NCLB, EDUC. WK., Dec. 10, 2008,
available
at
http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/school_law/2008/12/full_6th_circuit_
weighs_nea_su.html. The parties filed supplemental briefs in Feb. 2009. As of this
writing (January 2009), the court has not issued its decision.
22. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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regular primary and secondary schools. 23 Federal funding of
education began in earnest with the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA), a product of the civil
rights and antipoverty agendas of the 1960s. 24 The
overwhelming majority of ESEA funds were appropriated
under Title I for raising education spending for disadvantaged
students. 25 Although not an unconditional grant like most
earlier federal education spending, the intended uses of Title I
funds were loosely specified.26
Funding is not the only role the federal government has in
education. The federal judiciary frequently supervised the
desegregation of schools after 1954, when the Supreme Court
held in Brown v. Board of Education that, under the
Fourteenth Amendment, an opportunity for education, if
provided by a state, was "a right which must be made available
to all on equal terms." 27 In 1973, in San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez, the Court declined to extend that
holding to strike down longstanding school financing laws
whereby local property taxes largely supplement state and
federal funding in local schools and whereby even state funding
may be distributed unequally in favor of wealthier districts. 28
San Antonio held that there is no fundamental federal right to
an education29 or, if there is, then not to a particular quality of
education beyond a minimally adequate one. 30 Therefore, even
greatly unequal local school financing is constitutionally
23. See McGUINN, supra note 6, at 25-28.
24. Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965) (codified as a mended at 20 U.S.C. §§
630 1-794 1); see generally M CGU INN, supra note 6, at 25, 28--39.
25. See MCGUINN, supra note 6, at 32 ("[ESEA] did not provide general federal
aid to public schools. Instead, ESEA provided 'categorical' aid that was targeted to a
specific student population: disadvantaged students.").
26. See id. at 33-35.
27. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
28. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). In the three years between 1967 and 1970, the discrepancy
between Texas's funding of Edgewood and Alamo Heights increased from $3 per pupil
to $135 per pupil, partly because state funding levels were tied to school spending on
teaching salaries. See id. at 12-13, 13 n .35; id. at 79-81, 79 n.31 (Marshall, J. ,
dissenting).
29. ld. at 37 (majority opinion) ("We have carefully considered each of the
arguments supportive of the District Court's finding that education is a fundamental
right or liberty and have found those arguments unpersuasive.").
30. See id. at 36--37 ("Even if it were conceded that some identifiable quantum of
education is a constitutionally protected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of
either [First Amendment rights or the right to vote], we have no indication that the
present levels of educational expenditures in Texas provide an education that falls
short.").
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permissible. 31

2. Federal enforcement of equality and (under NCLB) of
adequacy
San Antonio thus put an end to the "first wave" of school
financing litigation that sought a federal remedy for unequal
education opportunities. 32 Its holding has never been revisited
and most likely never will be. 33
An enduring implication of San Antonio's holding is the
idea that education, despite its great importance to our system
of values, 34 is more like police, health, and other social services
rendered by state and local governments than it is a
fundamental and generative human right like voting. 35 San
Antonio rejected the view that education is generative of
freedom, that is, it rejected the argument that education "is
essential to the effective exercise of First Amendment freedoms
and to intelligent utilization of the right to vote."36 The Court
remarked: "[W]e have never presumed to possess either the
31. See id. at 46 (local funding "may far exceed even the total [state basic
education funding] grant").
32. See generally WOOD, supra note 12, at 53- 64; Joseph 0. Oluwole & Preston C.
Green, III, No Child Left Behind Act, Race, and Parents In volved, 5 HASTINGS RACE &
POVERTY L.J. 271 , 289- 94 (2008).
3'3. But see Daniel S. Greenspahn, A Constitutional Right To Learn: The
Uncertain Allure of Making a Federal Case Out of Education, 59 S.C . L. REV. 755, 772
(2008) ("[M]odern advocates pursuing a federal right to education ca n argu ably
overcome Rodriguez . .. . Rodriguez and subsequent Supreme Court decisions have
preserved the possibility of a federal right to an ed ucation."); WOOD, supra note 12, at
64 (although "any reversal" of San Antonio's holding that education is not a
fundamental right "is not likely to occur lightly," nevertheless "it is clear the Supreme
Court holds an undefined interest in education that may eventually emerge").
34. See San Antonio, 411 U.S. at 29-30.
35. See id. at 54 ("[l]f local taxation for local expenditures were an
unconstitutional method of providing for education then it might be an equally
impermissible means of providing other necessary services customarily fi n anced
largely from local property taxes, including local police and fire protection, public
health and hospitals, and public utility facilities of various kinds. We perceive no
justification for such a severe denigration of local property taxation and contr ol as
would follow from appellees' contentions. It has simply never been wit hin the
constitutional prerogative of this Court to nullify statewide measures for financing
public services merely because the burden or benefits thereof fall unevenly depending
upon the relative wealth of the political subdivisions in which citizens live."); id. at 30
("[T]he importance of a service performed by the State does not determine whether it
must
be
regarded
as
fundamental.").
The right t o vote is accorded special protection as "a fundamental political right,
because preservative of all rights." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964) (quoting
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)).
36. San Antonio, 411 U.S. at 35.
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ability or the authority to guarantee to the citizenry the most

effective speech or the most informed electoral choice ....
[These] are not values to be implemented by judicial intrusion
into otherwise legitimate state activities." 37
The San Antonio Court tempered its holding by stressing
the imperfections of the traditional school financing structure
and by urging a political fix:
[T]his Court's action today is not to be viewed as placing its
judicial imprimatur on the status quo. The need is apparent
for reform in tax systems which may well have relied too long
and too heavily on the local property tax. And certainly
innovative thinking as to public education, its methods, and
its funding is necessary to assure both a higher level of
quality and greater uniformity of opportunity. These matters
merit the continued attention of the scholars who already
have contributed much by their challenges. But the ultimate
solutions must come from the lawmakers and from the
democratic pressures of those who elect them. 38
A second and third wave of school financing litigation in
state courts took up the Court's challenge. 39 The federal
government expanded its funding and oversight of education in
the decades following San Antonio,40 spurred in part by the
reception of the dire 1983 report on education commissioned by
President Reagan, A Nation at Risk. 41 Most notably, it required
academic achievement standards for all students and tied
ESEA's Title I funding of disadvantaged students to those
standards in 1994. 42
But it was only with the enactment of NCLB that the
federal government took up where San Antonio left off and
claimed a truly aggressive and innovative role for itself in
reforming education inequalities. NCLB was enacted as the
latest reauthorization and amendment of ESEA and was the
37. ld. at 36.
38. ld. at 5&--59.
39. See generally WOOD, supra note 12, at 65-77; Oluwole & Green, supra note
32, at 291-94.
40. See MCGUINN, supra note 6, at 51-104; Umpstead , supra note 11, at 197- 98.
41. NAT'L COMM'N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., A NATION AT RISK: THE IMPERATIVE
FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM (1983), available at http://www.ed.gov/pubs/NatAtRisk/
titl e. html.
42. See Goals 2000: Educate America Act of 1994 (Goals 2000), Pub. L. No. 103227, 108 Stat. 125 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.);
Improving America's Schools Act of 1994 (IASA), Pub. L. No. 103-382, 108 Stat. 3518
(1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S. C.).
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first to dispense with ESEA's flexibility and to give its goals
real teeth. NCLB is best understood as civil rights legislation
that, under contemporary pressures on the federal government,
introduced unprecedented vigor in binding states to achieve the
goals of the 1965 law. 43 In the pressure that it places on states,
it is an attack on the stranglehold over education of the local
property tax system of school financing. 44 NCLB thus
counteracts San Antonio's tolerance of inequality and is clearly
motivated by the concept of equal protection of the laws
announced in the Fourteenth Amendment. 45 Although critics
have cried foul against the stringent new conditions NCLB
placed on the continuation of longstanding Title I funding that
states relied on, 46 NCLB's goals are unchanged from ESEA's. 47
Moreover, much of NCLB's framework of uniform academic
standards and accountability was put into law in 1994. 48 NCLB
simply stepped up the urgency and the stakes of these goals. 49

43. See MCGUINN, supra note 6, at 169-172.
44. For an overview of current school district funding inequalities analyzed by
concentration of minority population, see Oluwole & Green, supra note :32, at 287-88.
There may be renewed efforts to change the local property tax system of school
financing on the horizon. In 2006, the National Center on Education and the Economy
released a report by the New Commission on the Skills of the American Workforce,
Tough Choices or Tough Times, which includes a "proposal to abandon local funding of
schools in favor of state funding using a uniform pupil-weighting funding formula." See
Executive Summary at 17, available at http://skillscommission.org/executive.htm. The
report has been embraced by New Hampshire's education commissioner, and parts of
its recommendations are being implemented in three states. See Linda Jacobson, Pilot
Projects To Aim at Workforce Issues, EDUC. WK. (Bethesda, Md.), Nov. 5, 2008, at 13;
Cindy Kibbe, N.H. Plays Key Role in Education Overhaul Report, N.H. Bus. R~:v., Nov.
21, 2008, at 35.
45. It has been suggested that under current Fourteenth Amendment law, as
applied to education in Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551
U.S. 701 (2007), even race-conscious implementation of NCLB would survive judicial
review. Oluwole & Green, supra note 32, at 296-305.
46. See Sch. Dist. of Pontiac v. Sec'y of the U.S. Dep't of Educ., 512 F.3d 252, 267
n.4 (6th Cir. 2008) (vacated on other grounds); Bump, supra note 11, at 548, 551; see
also Connecticut Complaint, supra note 16, ~ 67.
47. But see MCGUINN, supra note 6, at 193 (seeing NCLB's focus on accountability
as "fundamentally chang[ing]" ESEA's goals and "creat[ing] a new [federal education]
policy regime").
48. Rudalevige, supra note 6, at 27.
49. Cf. MCGUINN, supra note 6, at 182 ("In essence, Goals 2000 encouraged states
to create standards, testing, and accountability systems but NCLB requires it .... ").
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B. NCLB's Requirements
1. Statutory provisions
NCLB requires states to adopt "challenging" and specific
academic content standards in language arts, mathematics,
and science and to align these with achievement standards for
basic, proficient, and advanced levels. 50 These standards must
be embodied in student assessments given annually in grades 3
through 8 and once in high school. 51 Most importantly, the
standards and assessments must be uniform throughout the
state. 52 States are required to develop an accountability system
that defines "adequate yearly progress" (AYP) and the methods
for calculating it, together with a timeline to track annual
progress toward NCLB's end goal of proficiency for all students
in 2014. 53 States must submit initial, detailed compliance plans
to the DOE. 54 The Secretary of Education has approval power
over the compliance plans but is also required to utilize the
assistance of a peer review process that includes parents,
teachers, and state education officials. 55 School districts and
states are then required to publish annual reports of data,
broken down to permit tracking of student performance by
economic, racial, and other indicators. 56 A number of remedies
and sanctions are provided for schools that fail to meet AYP for
any two consecutive years, ranging from offering students
supplemental educational services (free tutoring) and school
transfer privileges to closing and restructuring schools. 57
Finally, NCLB requires "highly qualified teachers" in every
classroom. 58 This is an overview of NCLB's most salient
requirements.
To demonstrate NCLB's lack of interest in dictating
particular standards for states to adopt, the section of the law
that defines "challenging academic standards" for the states'
purpose of writing the content and achievement standards for
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

20 U.S.C. § 631l(b)(l) (2006).
!d.§ 63ll(b)(3).
ld. §§ 6311(b)( l)(B), (b)(2)(C)(i), (b)(3)(C)(i).
!d. § 6311(b)(2).
!d . § 6311(a).
l d . § 63ll(e).
Id. §§ 6311(h), 63 16(a) .
!d. § 6316(b)-(f) .
ld. §§ 6314(b)(l)(C), 6315(c)(l)(E).
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the three core content areas is reproduced here in full:
(D) CHALLENGING ACADEMIC STANDARDS.-Standards
under this paragraph shall include(i) challenging academic content standards in academic
subjects that(I)

specify what children are expected to know and
be able to do;

(II) contain coherent and rigorous content; and
(III) encourage the teaching of advanced skills; and
(ii) challenging student academic achievement standards
that(I)

are aligned with the State's academic content
standards;

(II) describe

two levels of high achievement
(proficient and advanced) that determine how well
children are mastering the material in the State
academic content standards; and

(III) describe a third level of achievement (basic) to
provide complete information about the progress
of the lower-achieving children toward mastering
the
proficient
and
advanced
levels
of
59
achievement.

The requirements here concern administrative specificity
and informational transparency, not any particular level of
academic mastery, as the subjective descriptors "coherent,"
"rigorous," and "advanced" indicate. Similarly, the section of
the law that sets forth the parameters for defining AYP
concerns the state's demonstration of "valid and reliable"
statistics, "continuous and substantial academic improvement
for all students" and for specific subgroups of disadvantaged
students, and high school graduation rates; it does not suggest
any particular level or rate of progress. 60 NCLB expressly
denies the Secretary of Education "the authority to require a
State, as a condition of approval of the State plan, to include in,
or delete from, such plan one or more specific elements of the

59. ld. § 63ll(b)(l)(D).
60. Id. § 63ll(b)(2)(C).
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State's academic content standards or to use specific academic
assessment instruments or items." 61

2. Is NCLB a substitute for excellence, or a basis?
While it is true that NCLB's emphasis on annual testing,
elaboration of standards, and collection and dissemination of
data are unable to effect real academic improvement without a
more profound reform of curriculum, teaching methods, and
teacher preparation, it is equally true that education cannot be
significantly improved without a solid foundation of
assessment, accountability, and tracking, such as NCLB
requires . This is especially true for low-performing schools,
regardless of immediate negative impacts on passing rates and
missed AYP. 62
In fact, educators have long concentrated their efforts on
curriculum and teaching methods, but without concrete and
rigorous systems of assessment and accountability in place,
those efforts have made little, if any, lasting impact and have
often changed with the winds and little other reason. 63 Such
efforts have frequently focused on engaging and nurturing
students while overlooking and neglecting their actual
academic achievement. 64
61. Id. § 63ll(e)(1)(F).
62. See, e.g., Sam Dillon, Under "No Child" Law, Even Solid Schools Falter, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 13, 2008, at A1 ; David J. Hoff, More Schools Facing Sanctions Under
NCLB, Eouc. WK. , Dec. 19, 2008.
63. Twenty-five years after its publication, wh at is most remarkable about A
Nation at Risk is that it springs to commentators' minds less because of an anniversary
than because the realities it described have changed so little (and worsened, if
anything). Chief among those realities is our internationally "disproportionate share of
low-performing students." Edward B. Fiske, Op-Ed., A Nation at a Loss, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 25, 2008, at A27.
64. Howard Gardner's intuitive theory of multiple intelligences has been
enthusiastically embraced by educators for many years, but it leads many teachers to
neglect-without feeling they have done a disservice to their students-the academic
skills like reading and mathematics that are by far the most indispensable and the
most difficult to attain. Not so very far from this practice is an educational approach
that stresses inspirational curricula and social services over academic skills. Prominent
voices with the best intentions have called for just such an approach as a replace ment
for NCLB and an antidote to the difficulties it has created. See Lawrence, supra note
10, at 716-18; Sam Dillon, New Vision for Schools Proposes Broad Role, N.Y. TIMES,
July 14, 2008, at All (detailing Randi Weingarten's acceptance speech for her
nomination to the presidency of the American Federation of Teachers). This approach
is correct in its recognition that the consequences of entrenched racism and poverty
obstruct academic achievement--even seemingly fat ally. But it is misguided in its
assumption that the worse evils must be eradicated first. The ultimate solution simply
cannot be an either-or proposition or a first-second priority. Good teachers have always
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NCLB's transparency and reporting requirements, however
burdensome they may be, are appropriate and necessary in an
open society. Students' and parents' educational choices depend
on accurate information, 65 and so does the civic purpose of our
federation of states. NCLB puts academic achievement and
accountability first because they are the cornerstone of any
sound education policy. Objections to the high priority NCLB
gives them are misconceived.
Critics complain that NCLB's provisions for free tutoring
and transfer privileges are ineffective because "only about 1
percent of eligible students take advantage of switching schools
and fewer than 20 percent of eligibles receive extra tutoring."66
The complaint does not seem valid when the depth of the
problem and the incipiency of the remedy are taken into
account. Similarly, concerns that NCLB's tough requirements
lead to the "perverse" results of lowered academic standards
and lower graduation rates for the least privileged students are
well founded , as is recognition of the obstacles to placing
"highly qualified teachers" in every classroom. 67 Nevertheless,
it is fair to assume that the transparent r eporting instituted by
NCLB can lead, over time, to a correction of these problems.
NCLB, like any project to change cultural norms, requires a
suspension of our demand for decisive results in the short term.

3. Is NCLB an intrusion on state policy or a spur?
Complaints that NCLB directs state education policy are
inaccurate. 68 Particularly misleading is any implication that
NCLB imposes standards on states. In fact, NCLB requires
states to develop their own standards, design their own student
inspire d th eir students by nurturing th eir multiplici ty of learning styles a nd their
appreh ension of their social, physical, a nd psychological welfare. But teachers who
refuse t o acknowledge t he primary importance of students' achievement in r eading and
m athematics often leave their students with as little of t hose resources as t hey found
them. For a n eloquent exposition of what is at stake in NCLB's focus on core academic
skills a nd the star k feelings that r esult, see Sam Dillon , Schools Cut Back S ubjects To
Push Reading and M ath , N.Y. TIMES, Ma r . 26, 2006, at All.
65. See 20 U .S.C . §§ 6301(1), (1 2); 6311(a)(l); 6311 (b)(3)(C)(xii), (xv); 63 11(c)(1 4);
6311(d); cf. WOOD, supra note 12, at 78 (discussing access t o information as r elevant to
enfor cing r ights to an adequ ate education).
66. Ravitch, supra note 10.
67. See Darling-Ha mmond, supra note 6, at 4, 16, and genera lly.
68. As noted earlier , this argu ment is inext rica bly r elate d to the coercion
argu ment discussed in Par t III below. See, e.g. , Austin, supra note 11, at 365-68, cited
with approval in Weeden , supra note 11, at 242-43.
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assessments, define proficiency and AYP, and determine how
quickly their AYP will approach the 2014 goal of 100 percent
proficiency. 69 By reqmrmg states to develop statewide
standards that implement a uniform education policy, NCLB
works carefully with the constitutional imperatives. It respects
state control of education (as the Tenth Amendment requires),
and it preserves local governments' prerogative to supplement
education funding (as San Antonio requires) and hence to
enrich curriculum for local needs. Standards are, after all, only
a base for teaching.
The complaint that standardized testing forces teachers to
"teach to the test" and to neglect a rich curriculum has entered
the commonplace. 70 Research, it is argued, shows that "as a
rule, better standardized exam results are more likely to go
hand-in-hand with a shallow approach to learning than with
deep understanding"; thus, "a rise in scores may be worse than
meaningless: it may actually be reason for concern." 71 But the
assumption here-that preparing the most disadvantaged and
struggling students to pass standardized tests saps all other
time and energy for teaching and learning and precludes a rich
curriculum fostering critical and imaginative thinking-is a
fallacy. 72 The prevalence of the complaint against "teaching to
the test" is better interpreted as evidence of the need for
radical teaching and curriculum reform.
There is thus no foundation to the idea that NCLB imposes
education policy on states. Although the DOE has denied
requests for waivers, there is no evidence that states have been
penalized for submitting substandard plans or that the plans
must meet some unwritten expectations of federal policy.7 3 The
69. On the implications of states' choices to adopt a quicker or slower AYP, see
Thomas J. Kane & Douglas 0. Staiger, Unintended Consequences of Racial Subgroup
Rules, in No CHILD LEFT BEHIND?, supra note 6, at 152, 154; Dillon, supra note 62;
Hoff, supra note 62.
70. See generally Alfie Kohn, Fighting the Tests: A Practical Guide to Rescuing
Our Schools, PHI DELTA KAPPAN, Jan. 2001, at 348.
71. Id. at 350.
72. Kohn himself offers what he calls a "short-term response[]" that seems
perfectly judicious: "First, if you are a teacher, you should do what is necessary to
prepare students for the tests-and then get back to the rea/learning. Never forget the
difference between these two objectives." Id. at 350-51. Kohn betrays his own prejudice
here in his suggestion that performance on standardized tests is not evidence of "real
learning." Nevertheless, his ensuing discussion establishes the practicality (and
therefore the effectiveness) of his stated principle. See id. at 351.
73. Cf. Rudalevige, supra note 6, at 46 (the Bush administration "signaled a
hands-off stance on judging the quality of state standards and assessments.").
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popular misconception allows opponents of the law to obscure
their own role in opposing the adoption of state standards.
That is not to say that frictions are avoidable or that NCLB
presents no challenge to federalism. Nor is it to say the federal
government can do no better than it has done in NCLB. But
federal enforcement of equality is necessarily at times inimical
to entrenched local interests, as the history of the Fourteenth
Amendment, including its application to education pursuant to
Brown, has amply demonstrated. It is perhaps inevitable that
the pursuit of equality in education manifest itself temporarily
(again) as a struggle over institutional power and financial
resources. ESEA, after all, "was intended to be primarily a
redistributive bill." 74 NCLB executes that intention and upsets
the status quo of vastly unequal opportunities and outcomes in
education.

C. Costs and Funding Under NCLB
1. Facts

Congress's actual annual appropriations have never
equaled the amounts authorized under NCLB; they have been
between one-half and two-thirds of the amounts originally
authorized. 75 Nevertheless, the appropriations represent a
significant increase in federal funding of education-in the first
year of the program, federal funding increased by 26 percent
and, by 2005, the increases in federal funding that had resulted
from NCLB accounted for about 2 percent of the total education
spending by states, 76 a substantial increase, especially
considering that federal funding of education constitutes only
about 7 or 8 percent of total education spending. 77 NCLB's
74. MCGUINN, sup ra note 6, at 31.
75. The relevant figures are published by the DOE, teachers' unions, governors'
associations, and others. For synthesis and discussion, see Sch. Dist. of Pontiac v. Sec'y
of the U .S. Dep 't of Educ., 512 F.3d 252, 275-77 (6th Cir. 2008) (vacated on other
grounds) (McKeague, J., dissenting); Brief for the Governor of the Commonwealth of
Pa. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, id., at 6- 11 (No. 05-2708), 2006 WL
3837407; Oluwole & Green, supra note 32, at 295; and Umpstead, supra note 11, at
201-2.
76. See Umpstead, supra note 11, a t 201-02 (citing a 2005 report by the National
Conference of State Legislatures); cf. Stan Karp, NCLB's Selective Vision of Equality:
Some Gaps Count More than Others, in MANY CHILDREN LEIT BEHIND, supra note 2, at
53, 64 (estimating 1 percent, without attribution).
77. See Pontiac, 512 F.3d at 277 (McKeague, J., dissenting); Rudalevige, supra
note 6, at 45; Umpstead, supra note 11, at 201; Martin R. West & Paul E. Peterson,
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critics distort this reality with irresponsible exaggerations and
inaccuracies, such as the following: "NCLB places, without
remuneration, financially and bureaucratically onerous
reporting duties on states, districts, and schools. By contrast,
Title V of ESEA of the 89th Congress in 1965 added funds
directly to assist state departments of education to carry out
and extend the purposes of the Act." 78
Total federal appropriations under NCLB have covered only
approximately one-third of some states' costs of compliance.
Since the amounts originally authorized were only twice or less
than twice the actual appropriations, it is clear that even the
authorized amounts would have been insufficient to pay for
compliance without the need for states to incur costs of their
own. 79 Because states design their own assessments and
determine their own rates of progress, each state controls the
cost of its program, as the Connecticut example demonstrates.
Before the enactment of NCLB, Connecticut Mastery Tests
(CMTs) were given in grades 4, 6, and 8 and were nationally
recognized as models of high quality, comprehensive testing. 80
To avoid the cost of developing new CMTs for grades 3, 5, and
7, Connecticut requested a waiver of NCLB's annual
summative testing requirement. 81 It proposed substituting
much less expensive tests individualized by classroom and
offered sound rationale for such an education policy. 82 The
Bush administration DOE denied the request and suggested
that Connecticut use multiple choice tests in grades 3, 5, and 7
to comply with NCLB's requirements while avoiding the great
cost of developing and implementing new CMTs.83 Connecticut
viewed this advice as both unsound education policy and

Th e Politics and Practice of Accountability, in No CHILD LEFT BEHIND?, supra note 6,
at 1, l.
78. Theodore R. Sizer, Preamble: A Reminder for Americans, in MANY CHILDREN
LEr'l' BEHIND, supra note 2, xvii, at xxii (emphasis added) .
79. Pontiac, 512 F.3d at 276-77 (McKeague, J., dissenting). On the question of
whether costs associated with reaching proficiency by 2014 should be consider ed part of
NCLB's compliance costs, see Umpstead, supra note 11, at 223- 27. It seems unhelpful
to exclude these from calculations of NCLB's costs, but Umpstead's point that the
actu a l federal appropria tions have covered t he narrower administrative costs of
complying with NCLB is worth noting.
80. Connecticut Complaint, supra note 16, ~~ 1-2; see also Pendell, su.pra note 15,
at 521-2 3; see generally Connecticut I, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 475-78.
8 1. See Connecticut Complaint, supra note 16, ~~ 105, 112, 143.
82. Id. ~~ 107-13.
83. !d. ~~ 120, 137, 139, 153.

384

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2009

financially unworkable. 84 The DOE thus rejected Connecticut's
policy preferences in favor of strict compliance with NCLB.
Connecticut, for its part, proceeded to develop new CMTs for
grades 3, 5, and 7. This sequence of events makes it clear that
Connecticut took on the extra cost of developing CMTs as a
policy choice, not as a requirement of NCLB or the DOE, and
that reality serves to keep in perspective NCLB's true financial
effects.

2. NCLB's redistributive economic effects
The direct costs of implementing NCLB, particularly the
costs of developing and administering annual tests, are by all
accounts high. The charge that funding is inadequate for
compliance, though, again discounts the crucial factor of states'
policy choices. It would be difficult to understand why the
federal government should pay for Connecticut's choice to
develop highly sophisticated tests when other states have
adopted multiple choice tests to comply with NCLB. Such an
outcome would mean that Connecticut's testing program would
essentially be subsidized by the federal taxes collected from
residents of other states that provide lesser (more basic)
educational opportunities to their own residents than
Connecticut provided to its residents. 85 That outcome would
exacerbate rather than reduce pre-NCLB inequities.
NCLB's reporting requirements and the remedies and
sanctions it provides help clarify what is at stake in our
attitudes toward school financing. To put it plainly, NCLB
exposes the inevitable competition for achievement and funds
among and within districts and states. A state's choice to adopt
simpler or more elaborate assessments may stem from many
considerations: costs; reputation outside the state; and, within
the state, more concentrated lobbying efforts and more specific
political repercussions from public reporting of which schools
and students have achieved what levels of mastery.
NCLB's
remedies
and
sanctions
are
essentially
entitlements to compensate students in failing schools, putting
states under further pressure to avoid liability. Districts across
84. See id.

~~

140- 43.

85. Cf. Robert W. Adler, Unfunded Mandates and Fiscal Federalism: A Critique,
50 VAND. L. REV. 1137, 1212 (1997) ("If Congress must pay for sta te or local compliance
with federal law, the citizens of states with lower compliance costs will subsidize
compliance by states with higher costs.").
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the nation report cutting back on non-essential programs,
including arts, physical education, and academically
challenging elective courses. In many cases, they attribute this
to the costs of complying with NCLB. 86 While the complaint of
diluted curriculum is a valid and important education policy
concern, it also reveals that school districts are "diverting ...
funds from other important educational programs and
priorities" in order to teach basic academic skills tested under
NCLB. 87 To the extent that is true, NCLB is indirectly
effectuating a redistribution of school financing that has eluded
decades of other efforts. 88
The redistributive effects of promoting equality should come
as no surprise. The Sixteenth Amendment provides that
federally collected income taxes require no apportionment in
federal spending among the states 89 and was enacted (in 1913,
paradoxically, like NCLB, at the height of an era of restricted
federal power) to expand the power of the federal
government. 90
Even if Connecticut's education policy is better than
NCLB's, that does not make it the more appropriate policy for
Connecticut. Connecticut's policy preferences seek to maximize
academic excellence, while NCLB's seek the more mundane
(and historically elusive) goal of broadening basic academic
achievement. 91 Neither goal excludes the other, although
limitations of funds may require focusing on one or the other at
a given time. Coming three decades after San Antonio, NCLB
is an entirely fair swing of the pendulum.
The charge that NCLB is shortsighted is therefore a matter
of perspective. NCLB's priorities are democratizing and take a
long view of achieving equality. Nevertheless, NCLB in no way
impedes the continued supplemental funding of local education
with local property taxes. It gives an incomplete and distorted
86. See, e.g. , Pontiac, 512 F.3d at 259.
87. Jd. (quoting the plaintiffs in the case and citing the Joint Appendix).
88. For a discussion of some of the implications of this idea for school financing
litigation, see WOOD, supra note 12, at 77- 78.
89. "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from
whatever so urce derived, without apportionment among the several States, and
without regard to any census or enumeration." U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
90. See Adler, supra note 85, at 1209- 12, 1230.
91. As a bald illustration of t his idea , when Connecticut chose to use an
additional writing assess ment to satisfy a "third academic indicator" required for
reporting AYP under NCLB, see Connecticut Complaint, supra note 16, ~ 44, the DOE
suggested using daily attendance records instead as a cost-saving measure, id. ~ 138.
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picture to attribute reduction of academic enrichment
programs to the costs of NCLB and not to local communities'
fiscal priorities.
III. NCLB AND CONDITIONAL SPENDING

A. Congress's Spending Power

1. Evolution and scope
The Taxing and Spending Clause of the Constitution gives
Congress the power to tax and spend for two main purposes:
the "common defense" and the "general welfare." 92 Since 1936,
the Supreme Court has held that Congress' spending for the
general welfare is not limited to its specifically enumerated
powers under the Constitution. 93
The ruling adopting this broad purpose for spending came
in United States v. Butler, where the Court nevertheless struck
down the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1931 on the grounds
that its tax subsidy for farmers who complied with the program
by restricting their production "invade[d] the reserved rights of
the states" and was "a statutory plan to regulate and control"
matters of state law. 94 Butler held that the Tenth Amendment
barred federal taxation and spending with a "coercive purpose"
to "purchase a compliance [from the states] which the Congress
is powerless to command." 95 The Court concluded that farmers
were nominally but "not in fact" free to "refuse to comply" with
the subsidy program, because "the price of such refusal [was]
the loss of benefits," and non-participating farmers would be
unable to compete on the market and risked "financial ruin." 96
The Court articulated broad warnings against the dangers of
coercive spending:
It does not help to declare that local conditions throughout
the nation have created a situation of national concern; for
92. "The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts,
and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare
of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout
the United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
93. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65-66 (1936).
94. Id. at 68.
95. Id. at 70-71.
96. Id.
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this is but to say that whenever there is a widespread
similarity of local conditions, Congress may ignore
constitutional limitations upon its own powers and usurp
those reserved to the states. If, in lieu of compulsory
regulation of subjects within the states' reserved jurisdiction,
which is prohibited, the Congress could invoke the taxing and
spending power as a means to accomplish the same end, [the
Taxing and Spending Clause] would become the instrument
for total subversion of the governmental powers reserved to
the individual states. 97

Although the Butler Court removed virtually any restriction
on "general welfare," it sought to disempower Congress by
preempting justifications based on national crisis and by
framing its analysis of federal spending in terms of potential
end-runs around the Tenth Amendment. Still, the decision's
focus on farmers suggested its real concern lay with free
markets as much as with states' autonomy.
In the year after Butler was decided, the Court was won
over to the New Deal and, in Steward Machine Company v.
Davis, refused to find coercive spending in the incentives
provided by the Social Security Act for states to create
unemployment funds. 98 Steward Machine's echo of Butler's
language of "national concern" revealed the sea change in the
Court's attitude toward the benign use of federal policy:
The [unemployment] problem had become national in area
and dimensions. There was need of help from the nation if the
people were not to starve. It is too late today for the argument
to be heard with tolerance that in a crisis so extreme the use
of the moneys of the nation to relieve the unemployed and
their dependents is a use for any purpose narrower than the
promotion of the general welfare. 99

Steward Machine remarked that the difference between
persuasion and compulsion was "a question of degree, at times,
perhaps, of fact," 100 but the truth of that statement is called
into question by the fact that the Court has not struck down an
exercise of the spending power since Butler in 1936. The
historical moment of the decision in Steward Machine seems to
suggest rather that Congress's power of persuasion is a
97.
98.
99.
100.

ld. at 74-75.
301 u.s. 548, 589 (1937).
ld. at 586--87.
Id. at 590.
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question of balance between the states' political and financial
leverage and national need.
The Court most recently comprehensively considered the
spending power in 1987. 101 South Dakota v. Dole upheld
legislation requiring states to raise the minimum drinking age
to 21 as a condition of receipt of federal funds for highway
construction. 102 The Court set forth no new law, but drew on
existing law to reiterate four "restrictions" on Congress's use of
the spending power: (i) spending must be for the general
welfare, (ii) conditions on states' receipt of funds must be
unambiguous and (iii) related to a federal interest in a national
project, and (iv) neither the spending nor the conditions may
transgress any independent bar in another constitutional
provision. 103 Dole reaffirmed the broad principle that
"encouragement to state action . . . is a valid use of the
spending power" 104 and Congress may "further broad policy
objectives by conditioning receipt of federal moneys upon
compliance by the recipient with federal statutory and
administrative directives." 105 The Court noted, almost in
passing, that placing conditions on receipt of Congress's
funding runs a risk of unconstitutional coercion but rejected
the argument that coercion was present in the case before it,
reasoning that South Dakota stood to lose only 5 percent of its
federal highway funding. 106

2. The renewed threat from federalism
Dissenting in Dole, Justice O'Connor argued that
Congress's action was "an attempt to regulate the sale of
liquor." 107 She further argued under the relatedness restriction
that the condition imposed by Congress appeared to be
motivated by a desire for highway safety unrelated to the
federal interest in highway construction. 108 With these
arguments, Justice O'Connor advocated passionately for a

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
Burger,
106.
107.
108.

South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
Id. at 206.
Id. at 207-08.
Id. at 212.
Id. at 206 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980) (opinion of
C.J.)).
Id. at 211.
Id. at 212 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
See id. at 218.
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return to the analytical approach of Butler:
The Butler Court saw the Agricultural Adjustment Act for
what it was-an exercise of regulatory, not spending,
power . ...
. . . If the spending power is to be limited only by Congress'
notion of the general welfare, the reality, given the vast
financial resources of the Federal Government, is that the
Spending Clause gives "power to the Congress to tear down
the barriers, to invade the states' jurisdiction, and to become
a parliament of the whole people .. . ."109

Justice O'Connor's position in Dole should be understood
from the perspective of the federalism revolution that was to
come from the Court in the 1990s, when it restricted Congress's
powers under the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth
Amendment and applied the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments
as limits against Congressional power, in some cases for the
first time since the New Deal. 110
Professor Chemerinsky believes the spending power has a
unique role among the federal powers and finds a suggestion of
its insulation from the federalism revolution in the fact that
Chief Justice Rehnquist authored both the Dole decision and
several of the later decisions curbing federal power. 111 But that
begs the question of whether it will be the sea change in the
Court's attitude to federalism that largely determines the
outcome of its next spending power case.
Some scholars argue that the Court should place limits on
109. ld. at 216-17 (quoting United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 78 (1936)).
llO. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (in creating a damages
remedy against states in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Congress
exceeded its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power and unconstitutionally
abrogated states' Eleventh Amendment immunity); United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598 (2000) (Congress exceeded its Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment
enforcement powers in creating a civil remedy for violent crimes motivated by gender
in the Violence Against Women Act); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)
(Fourteenth Amendment did not empower Congress to limit states' power to burden
the free exercise of religion in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act) ; Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (Congress did not have power to direct states to conduct
background checks of prospective firearm purchasers in the Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (Congress exceeded its
Commerce Clause power in criminalizing possession of firearms in vicinity of schools);
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (Spending Clause power permits
Congress to incentivize states' regulation of hazardous waste disposal, but Tenth
Amendment prevents it from compelling such state regulation).
lll. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Protecting the Spending Power, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 89,
95 (2001).
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the spending power. 112 In their view, Congress uses its
conditional spending, as Butler warned, to effect a dubious endrun around the Constitution's restrictions. 113 On the other
hand, the Sixteenth Amendment secures the federal
government's power to achieve redistributive effects among the
states, and its implications for federalism have not been fully
appreciated. 114 It is difficult to gauge the extent to which these
contrary arguments will shape the Court's views when it next
hears a major spending power case. 115 That is all the more so,
since the Court has backed off its federalism revolution
considerably since the 1990s, and some decisions have newly
reaffirmed the supremacy of federal law in regulating activities
with little discernible interstate purpose or federal interest. 116
B. NCLB's Basis Under the Spending Clause

1. NCLB's § 7907(a) and the constitutional requirement of clear
notice
It is widely remarked that three of the four restrictions on
the spending power discussed in Dole carry little real weight. 11 7
As to one of those three (the relatedness requirement), Justice
O'Connor showed how it could be applied with real weight in
her dissent in Dole. As to the other two of these restrictions
(the requirements to serve the general welfare and to respect

112. See generally Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 1911 (1995); Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting Off the
Dole: Why the Court Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever
Congress Could Provoke It To Do So, 78 I ND. L.J. 459 (2003).
113. See Baker & Berman, supra note 112, at 499-503 (describing the "loophole"
the spending power offers to Congress to "circumvent" and "to effectively overturn
Supreme Court decisions that have restricted congressional power").
114. See Adler, supra note 85, at 1209 & n.337.
115. Professor Adler suggests a constitutional amendment may be needed to
change the scope of the spending power. I d. at 1209 n.334.
116. See Gonzales v. Raich , 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (upholding the applicatio n of the
Controlled Substances Act to home growth of marijuana not intended for sale as valid
exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509
(2004) (upholding the Americans with Disabilities Act's creation of a damages remedy
against states as valid exercise of Congress's Fourteenth Amendment enforcement
power and valid abrogation of states' Eleventh Amendment immunity); Nev. Dep't of
Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (same with respect to the Family and
Medical Leave Act). For discussion, see Samuel R. Bagenstos, Spending Clause
Litigation in the Roberts Court, 58 DUKE L.J. 345, 347-49 (2008).
117. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 85, at 1204; Baker & Berman, supra note 112, at
463- 66.
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constitutional prohibitions), the Supreme Court itself has noted
their lack of forcefulness. 118
The fourth restriction, however-the unambiguo~s or clear
notice requirement-has frequently been engaged by courts.
The idea here is that only unambiguous conditions can "enable
the States to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the
consequences of their participation." 119 The Supreme Court has
explained the clear notice requirement by noting that
conditional spending is "much in the nature of a contract." 120
Typically, Congress agrees to provide funds in exchange for a
state's agreement to further federal policy. The problem of
unclear notice is especially acute in situations like that created
by NCLB, "where Congress has intended the States to fund
certain entitlements as a condition of receiving federal
funds ." 121 Fairness and the concept of contractual choice
require states' knowing agreement to fund programs whose
dimensions and costs cannot be foreseen and therefore cannot
be confined to particular federal grants. The clear notice
requirement is one of the major grounds of the litigation
challenging NCLB.
In Connecticut v. Spellings, Connecticut claimed that the
DOE's denial of its waiver requests (or proposed plan
amendments) required it to spend its own funds to comply with
NCLB and that this violated § 7907(a), NCLB's so-called
unfunded mandates provision. 122 Section 7907(a) states:

118. The Court "questioned wheth er 'general welfare' is a judicially enforceable
restriction at all" and noted the "unexceptional proposition" of its interpretation of the
independent constitutional bar restriction as applyi ng not to "the indirect achieve ment
of objectives which Congress is not empowered to achieve directly" but m erely to
"activities that would themselves be unconstitutional." South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S.
203, 207 n.2 , 210 (1987) .
11 9. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 17-18.
122. See Connecticut v. Spellings (Connecticut II) , 549 F. Supp. 2d 161, 177 (D.
Conn.
2008).
The term "unfunded mandate" grew out of the political movement to limit federal
power in the 1980s and 1990s. See generally Adler, supra note 85. As appli ed to
conditional spending measures (participation in which is by definition voluntary), the
term can be misleading. The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 1044, 109 Stat. 48 (1995) (as codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S. C.) (UMA), defined the
term "Federal intergovernmental mandate" to exclude "condition[s] of Federal
assistance ." 2 U.S.C. § 658(5)(A)(i)(I), noted in Pontiac, 512 F.3d at 267; cf. Adler, supra
note 85. at 1204 ("Even if considered mandates rather than voluntarily assumed
obligations, conditions of federal assistance are supported by independent legal
authority
under
the
Spending
Clause.").
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Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize an officer
or employee of the Federal Government to mandate, direct, or
control a State, local educational agency, or school's
curriculum, program of instruction, or allocation of State or
local resources, or mandate a State or any subdivision thereof
to spend any funds or incur any costs not paid for under this
Act.I23

Connecticut claimed that § 7907(a) relieved it of having to
spend its own funds beyond those provided by Congress to
comply with NCLB's requirements. 124 The district court did not
reach the § 7907(a) issue, but ruled that Connecticut's failure
to raise the dispute with the DOE prevented jurisdiction. 125
School District of Pontiac u. Secretary of the United States
Department of Education made explicit the connection between
the § 7907(a) issue and the clear notice requirement of
Spending Clause law. 126 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit reached the constitutional question of whether, in light
of the allegedly contradictory language of § 7907(a), NCLB
provided clear notice to states of their obligations to spend
their own funds to comply with the law as a condition of
receiving federal funds. 127 The plaintiffs argued (as in
Connecticut) that § 7907(a) means states need only comply with
the requirements of NCLB to the extent that federal funds are
made available to pay for them. 128 The Bush administration
argued that § 7907(a) merely prohibits federal officials from
imposing additional requirements beyond those specified in
NCLB, and that states participating in NCLB must comply
with all its requirements, "even if they must spend non-federal
funds to do so." 129
The Sixth Circuit held in a 2-1 decision that the law did not
provide clear notice, although that panel ruling is now vacated
Section 7907(a) may signal Congress's intention to comply with UMA. It may just as
well, however, suggest inattention or avoidance. See Pontiac, 512 F.3d at 267 (§ 7907(a)
was borrowed wholesale from a 1988 education law that predated UMA); id. at 268
("NCLB makes no reference to the UMA's definition of 'mandate' .... "). It is probably
futile to seek to resolve the contradictions inherent in the language and purpose of
§ 7907(a).
123. 20 U.S.C. § 7907(a) (2006).
124. Connecticut II, 549 F . Supp. 2d at 177.
125. ld. at 180-81.
126. Pontiac, 512 F.3d at 254.
127. Id.
128. ld. at 256-57.
129. Id. at 265, 260.
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a nd the Court of Appeals heard reargument en bane in
December, 2008. 130 The vacated decision concluded that,
although NCLB is unambiguous in stating the requirements
that are conditions of states' receiving federal funds, § 7907(a)
makes it unclear whether states must spend their own funds to
meet those requirements. 131 If that view prevails on rehearing,
the DOE would be legally unable to enforce penalties for noncompliance based on insufficiency of federal funds (at least in
the Sixth Circuit). It would also seriously weaken the DOE's
leverage, and it would possibly mean that the remedies NCLB
makes available to students in deficient schools such as free
tutoring and transfer options would become, for most practical
purposes, unenforceable. 132 On the other hand, the victory
would be a narrow one, since the ruling would not carry the
penetrating force of a finding of coercion. That is, following a
declaratory judgment of unconstitutionality under the clear
notice restriction of the Spending Clause, Congress would be
able to repair the defects caused by the language of § 7907(a)
fairly easily, if it chose to do so. 133
Pontiac's clear notice litigation seems like a temporary
distraction from the more profound issues of federalism raised
by NCLB. 134 It may effectively highlight the political
dimensions of the federalism debate-for example, by
demonstrating the haste under which Congress may have acted
to pass NCLB or the pressure on states to rise to the challenges
and ideals the law poses. It does not, however, provide the
basis for a ruling on the fundamental legal question of whether
NCLB crosses the absolute (and, since 1937, theoretical)

130. Pontiac, 512 F .3d 252; Walsh, supra note 21. No decision has been issued as of
t his writin g (J a nu ar y 2009).
13 1. Pontiac, 512 F .3d at 269 .
1:32. S ee Al exa ndra Villarr ea l O'Rourke , Note, Picking Up the Pieces After PIGS:
Evaluating Current Efforts To Narrow the Education Gap, 11 H ARV. L A'l'JNO L. R EV.
26:3 , 2 74 (2008) .
133. S ee Pontiac, 512 F.3d at 272 ("(T]he ball is proper ly left in [Congress's] cou rt

. .. .").
134. ld. a t 267 ("Plaint iffs' content ion is not that NCLB as a whole i s an unfunded
mandate forced upon t he States; they appear willing to concede tha t it is a volu nta ry
program . . . ."); cf. id. a t 264 ("Indeed, perh a ps the Secreta ry's view of the text is
ultimately cor rect. But th e only relevant question h ere is wheth er the Act provides
clear notice to the States of their obligation ."); but see Bagen stos, supra note 116, at
393- 409 (a rguing that the Supreme Court is likely to invoke the clear notice
requ irement in creasingly in the future a s an indirect limitation on Congr ess's spending
power).
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constitutional line of coercion. 135

2. The coercion claim and pre-enforcement declaratory
judgment
The fundamental constitutional question is whether
(assuming clear notice) NCLB represents a coercive attempt to
impose federal education policy on the states. There are a
number of considerations that make bringing such a claim
impractical, as, agam, Connecticut's expenence helps
illustrate.
First, without exercising its right to opt out of NCLB, any
state challenging the law on the grounds of coercion would, like
Connecticut before it, be bringing a pre-enforcement claim
unlikely to survive a motion to dismiss. Connecticut's facial
challenge to NCLB was dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction on the grounds that the penalty to be applied for
non-compliance was hypothetical as well as indeterminate. 136
The district court noted that Connecticut was in full
compliance with the law, and, because any eventual penalty
would be subject to the DOE's discretion, the court would not
rely on speculation based on the DOE's responses to other
states' inquiries about the consequences of non-compliance. 137
Despite studies commissioned by state legislatures of the
consequences of opting out of NCLB, no state has in fact opted
out.
Second, courts have regularly found the coercion test, which
requires an inquiry into states' financial capabilities, to be both
"unworkable" in practice 138 and a political question
inappropriate for judicial resolution. 139 Total federal financial

135. In any case, the dissenting judge in the vacated Pontiac ruling argued
forcefully that the misleading language of § 7907(a) is a negligible aberration in an
otherwise coherent and comprehensive statutory scheme consistent with historical
practice. See Pontiac, 512 F.3d at 277 (McKeague, J., dissenting) ("Plaintiffs'
interpretation of the NCLB not only disregards its overall statutory scheme, but it also
defies reason and history."). That view likely motivated the judges' vote to rehear the
case en bane.
136. See Connecticut I, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 491-94.
137. See id. at 494, 494 n.20; Connecticut Complaint, supra note 16, ,1~ 66-69.
138. Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 448 n.6 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 249 (2d ed. 1988)).
139. See, e.g., id. at 448 ("The difficulty if not the impropriety of making judicial
judgments regarding a state's financial capabilities renders the coercion theory highly
suspect as a method for resolving disputes between federal and state governments.";
"The purpose of the coercion test is to protect state sovereignty from federal incursions.
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support of state programs is so extensive that it is difficult to
make an effective claim of coercion based on the withholding of
only one among many types of funding. 140
Third, an ultimate finding of coercion in NCLB's conditions
is far from assured. Federal funding constitutes approximately
7 or 8 percent of total education spending. 141 Connecticut
estimated that if the DOE were to withhold all of its Title I
funding, as well as other portions of its education funding, it
stood to lose "up to 5%" of its total education budget. 142 These
percentage figures , viewed from the perspective of case law
(including Dole, where 5 percent of highway funds were at
stake), strongly suggest that no finding of coercion in NCLB
can be sustained without an about-face on spending power law
from the Supreme Court. 143
On the other hand, to the extent that a finding of coercion
rests on the facts of a case (as Steward Machine maintained),
the application of NCLB presents a fairly convincing set of
facts. 144 States relied on ESEA funds for nearly 40 years with
few strings attached and the addition of substantial new
requirements placed as conditions on continued receipt of those
very funds can be seen as coercive. 145 Even if those funds
represent only 5-8 percent of a state's education spending, in
Connecticut that amounted to approximately $300 million
annually-not an insignificant amount. 146 A state choosing to
opt out of NCLB would, in effect, be forfeiting its share of
federal funds raised through federal taxation of its citizens; it

If this sovereignty is adequately protected by the national political process, we do not
see any reason for asking the judiciary to settle questions of policy and politics that
range beyond its normal expertise."); see also Chemerinsky, supra note 111, at 102-03.
140. See Adler, supra note 85, at 1256 ("Given the complex interrelationship of
federal tax, spending, and regulatory policies, it is impossible for federal courts, bound
by the narrow constraints of party-defined litigation, to assess the fiscal burdens of
individual federal programs in the proper context .... The fact that states and cities
remain n et fiscal beneficiaries of intergovernmental programs suggests that lower
levels of government do receive adequate protection and representation in this
ma nner.").
141. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
142. Connecticut I, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 493.
143. Since Dole, courts have upheld spending conditions where much more than 5
percent of a state's funds were at stake. In Skinner, for example, the Ninth Circuit
found no coercion, although 95 percent of Nevada's highway funds were to be withheld
if it did not adopt the national speed limit. 884 F.2d at 446.
144. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
145. See Pontiac, 512 F.3d at 267 n.4; Bump, supra note 11, at 548, 551.
146. See Connecticut Complaint, supra note 16, '11'11 63, 65, 67-69.
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would face the politically infeasible task of raising state taxes
to compensate for the forfeited federal tax funding. 147
And yet 5 percent is only 5 percent. What this analysis of
the strongest case of coercion on the facts of NCLB suggests
more than anything else is that the ultimate outcome of a
coercion suit would rest principally (as the historical context of
Steward Machine, rather than its dictum, suggests) on the
Supreme Court's attitude toward national imperatives and
state autonomy.

IV. CONCLUSION
This comment has argued that a sound education policy
cannot exist without uniform standards and transparent
accountability. It has also argued that historical forces and
socio-economic realities make a federal role in education
necessary to achieve equal opportunity. Such a federal role is
appropriate from the viewpoint of the Fourteenth Amendment,
and so is the resulting financial burden on states. Because local
school districts retain the prerogative of supplementing state
and federal funding of education with local property taxes, the
charge that NCLB dilutes their curriculum is unconvincing.
If NCLB has diluted or qualified state control of education,
it has also provided considerable new funding and carefully
preserved states' choices in education policy. Weighing the
proportionality of these factors is a difficult, perhaps
impossible endeavor. Unless the full panel of Sixth Circuit
appellate judges unexpectedly reverses the district court's
holding in Pontiac, NCLB litigation appears to have been
futile. States should therefore reconcile themselves to NCLB's
requirements, and Congress should work with them to
reauthorize an improved version that moves beyond standards
to encompass teaching reform as well.
Without a sustained effort to build on the foundation of an
adequate education, NCLB will lose the high ground it has
claimed. Initiatives to reform curriculum and teacher
preparation will be much more expensive and difficult to
implement than NCLB's current provisions. Congress, too,
must put its money where its mouth is.
147. See Baker, supra note 112, at 1937, 1937 n.134; Brian Galle, Getting
Spending: How to Replace Clear Statement Rules with Clear Thinking About
Conditional Grants of Federal Funds , 37 CONN. L. REV. 155, 169-70 (2004) .
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Congress' power of conditional spending to address national
problems is an enormously effective tool of federal power over
the states. Just as importantly, though, federal conditional
spending also provides an ideal forum for state and federal
cooperation. When Congress spends in an area like education,
over which it has no direct constitutional power, it is most
dependent on the states' assent, and the states' leverage over
Congress is at its maximum. 148 Similarly, negotiation between
states and federal agencies is superior to the theoretical
concept of clear notice in unambiguous legislation. 149
The Bush administration, tardily but with laudable
responsiveness, showed a greater willingness in its final year to
negotiate and to cooperate with states. 150 The lllth Congress
and the Obama administration DOE should move in the same
direction but guard carefully against the dangers of
perfunctorily increasing the use of waivers, watering down
NCLB's accountability measures, and increasing funding
without expanding NCLB's education goals. It would be a
shame if the most pervasive equality measure in decades were
to lapse or waste into inconsequentiality before it is fully
recognized for what it is. Despite the San Antonio Court's
formulation, 151 education is generative of all our freedoms.

Anthony Consiglio*

148. See Adler, supra note 85, at 1237; David E. Engdahl, The Contract Thesis of
the Federal Spending Power, 52 S.D. L. REV. 496, 500-1 (2007); Galle, supra note 147,
at 188--89.
149. See Galle, supra note 147, at 18 1-83.
150. For example, the Bush administration DOE permitted six states to participate
in a pilot program to experiment with a more flexible classification of deficient schools
and a more flexible application of sanctions, so that states might focus their resources
on their more poorly performing schools. See Laura Diamond, Feds: Tutor Kids Early,
ATLANTAJ.-CONST., July 2, 2008, at B l.
151. See supra notes 29- 30 and accompanying text.
* J .D. candidate (2011), Brooklyn Law School; M.A. , University of California, Los
Angeles; Maitrise, Universite de Lyon II, France. For uncredited views and arguments
pertaining to education policy a nd teaching practices (particularly in some of the
footnotes) , I have drawn on ten years of experience as an English teacher in public high
schools in New York and Connecticut. I dedicate this comment to (who else?) two of my
teachers: Katherine Callen King, whose activism and passion for social justice were my
first introduction to the noble achievement and arduous challenge of expanding access
to a quality education; and Nelson Tebbe, whose courageous teaching led me to think I
could wrestle some truth out of that ferocious and graceful American Proteus, the
Tenth Amendment. The conclusions reached here are carefully considered rather than
resolute; an open and searching mind is what I ask of myself and my readers.
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